The Internationalized Contract and the Populist Backlash to the Fine Print by Marquina, Erick
Maryland Journal of International Law 
Volume 35 Issue 1 Article 17 
The Internationalized Contract and the Populist Backlash to the 
Fine Print 
Erick Marquina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Erick Marquina, The Internationalized Contract and the Populist Backlash to the Fine Print, 35 Md. J. Int'l 
L. 230 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol35/iss1/17 
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an 
authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact 
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu. 




The Internationalized Contract and the 
Populist Backlash to the Fine Print 
ERICK MARQUINA†  
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that sovereign States are wary of investor-state 
dispute settlement (“ISDS”)1 through which foreign investors, namely 
multinational corporations (“MNCs”), can unilaterally compel 
binding arbitration for violations of bilateral investment treaty 
(“BITs”) obligations, often through treaty shopping.2  A powerful 
example of how far those obligations and treaty shopping can extend 
is the “internationalized” contract, which arises whenever a foreign 
investor uses a signatory host state’s BIT terms, such as umbrella 
clauses and Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) language, to 
broaden the treaty’s protections to encompass a purely domestic 
transaction.3  In an international legal arena governed by principles of 
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 1. Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?, 
43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 639, 649-50, 658-59 (2018) (discussing criticisms from United 
States conservatives who argue that ISDS will undermine United States’ sovereignty by 
giving international arbitrators a role typically reserved for domestic courts, as well as 
opposition from other countries, such as Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and India); see 
generally Dani Rodrick, Populism and the economics of globalization, J. INT’L. BUS. POLICY 
(Dec. 2018), https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-
rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf. 
 2. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 233, 275-83 
(2015). 
 3. See id. at 249. 
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sovereignty and consent,4 the internationalized contract and its 
underlying mechanics sparked a populist backlash from many States 
that once tolerated the scope of BIT protections.5  Two questions 
arise in this context: (1) Does the internationalized contract and its 
mechanisms warrant such a strong populist backlash?  (2) Will the 
internationalized contract as a doctrine survive this populist 
backlash?  This Article’s answer to both questions is no and likely 
not, respectively.6 
Understanding the internationalized contract necessarily requires 
understanding the international legal world in which it was born.  Part 
II introduces that world’s background by discussing BITs, 
international investment law, ISDS, International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the internationalized 
contract from a doctrinal perspective, and the populist backlash to 
those underlying mechanisms.7  Then, Part III argues that States see 
the internationalized contract and its mechanisms as an impermissible 
encroachment on sovereignty, which gave rise to a populist 
backlash.8  This Article analyzes the merits of that backlash and 
argues that the internationalized contract will likely not remain in 
place if populist States continue their backlash.9  Lastly, Part IV 
concludes by arguing that the internationalized contract, though 
powerful, is a fairly limited doctrine that itself is subject to sovereign 
forces that States already possess, which suggests that its days are 
numbered.10 
II. BACKGROUND 
The internationalized contract is a doctrinal merger between 
international law’s powerful protections for foreign investments and 
domestic contract law.11  Those protections manifest through BITs 
and international investment law, which govern transactions between 
 
 4. See Anna Cavnar, The Foreign Office Model versus the Global Governance Model: 
An Introduction, INST. INT’L L. JUST., 2-3, (Dec. 17, 2019), http://iilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Cavnar-The-Foreign-Office-Model-Versus-the-Global-
Governance-Model-2008.pdf. 
 5. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON 
POL., 1 (June 20, 2019). 
 6. Infra Part III(D). 
 7. Infra Part II. 
 8. Infra Part III. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Infra Part IV. 
 11. Infra Part II(C). 
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foreign investors, such as MNCs, and host states.12  Any disputes 
arising from transactions protected within the ambit of BITs are 
adjudicated through ISDS in international tribunals, such as ICSID.13  
ICSID as a tribunal determines whether BIT protections reach certain 
transactions and, if so, to what extent.14  Various cases demonstrate 
that domestic contracts and those underlying obligations can 
themselves come under the aegis of BIT protections, which gives rise 
to internationalized contracts.15  Those broad protections strike 
strongly in favor of foreign investors and against the host state, 
whose sovereign interests in regulating markets within its territory 
must often yield to BIT enforcement through ISDS.16  Recently, 
States have voiced their concerns over what they see as a gross 
encroachment on sovereignty and the voice of the State’s people.17  
Those voices, though not new, recently became salient once more 
States expressed their frustrations with the current MNC-favored 
regime, which led to a populist backlash against the doctrine and its 
mechanisms.18 
A. Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Investment 
BITs are agreements between two sovereign States that “protect 
investment by investors of one state in the territory of another state 
by articulating substantive rules governing the host state’s treatment 
of the investment and by establishing dispute resolution mechanisms 
applicable to alleged violations of those rules.”19  BIT rules generally 
come in two forms: negative obligations, which impose a duty on a 
government to not act, and a positive obligation, which imposes an 
affirmative duty on a government to defend the investor from threat 
or hardship.20  From 1959 to 2002, nearly 2200 individual BITs 
formed, which makes the BIT one of the most widely used form of 
international agreement for protecting foreign investments.21 
 
 12. Infra Part II(A). 
 13. Infra Part II(B). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Infra Part II(C). 
 16. Infra Part II(B). 
 17. Infra Part II(D). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 469, 469-70 (2000). 
 20. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 417, 421 (2006) 
 21. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 67 
(2005) 
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A BIT’s purpose is twofold: “to stimulate the reciprocal flow of 
investment between countries and to afford both countries legal 
protection in either jurisdiction.”22  BITs come with a variety of titles, 
such as “treaties,” “conventions,” and “agreements,” but an important 
point is that they fall within the definition of “treaty” under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.23  In terms of definitions 
under a BIT, an “investor” is a natural person or legal entity making 
the investment in the territory of the other party.24  However, an 
“investment” has no fixed definition.25  However, an investment can 
generally include “assets or inputs in money or services, which is 
invested or reinvested in a sector of economic activity.”26 
Regarding investments, international investment law is primarily 
focused on foreign direct investment (“FDI”), that is, “the transfer of 
tangible or intangible assets from one country into another for the 
purpose of use in that country to generate wealth under the total or 
partial control of the owner of the assets.”27  FDIs involve two states: 
 
 22. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign 
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 257-58 (1994). At this point, note that there is vast 
literature discussing the scope of BITs, ISDS as a process, ICSID as a forum, and general 
criticisms the spawned from those international legal instruments.  This Article will avoid 
any superfluous and idiosyncratic analysis of these subjects primarily to avoid diluting its 
main point, which is the underlying internationalized contract doctrine and a populist 
response therefrom. See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, DO BITS 
REALLY WORK?: AN EVALUATION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND 
THEIR GRAND BARGAIN.  46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005). 
 23. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign 
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 257 (1994); Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT) (defining “treaty” as an 
“international agreement, concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation;”) (emphasis added). 
 24. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign 
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 259 (1994). 
 25. Infra Part II(C).  In fact, the definition of an “investment” is at the heart of the 
internationalized contract doctrine because tribunals dealing with this doctrine ultimately 
must decide whether the foreign investor’s domestic contract is an “investment” protected 
under the BIT. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award ¶ 
299 (holding that a BIT’s umbrella clause offers international remedies for State contractual 
violations).  But see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406, 
P161 (2005) (refusing to extend BIT protections to a domestic contractual violation absent 
an express provision in the treaty permitting such a protection). 
 26. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign 
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 259 (1994).  Some treaties go further to explicitly 
describe various types of investments. Id. The “majority of agreements” typically outline the 
following: “stocks, credits, securities, real estate, and personal property, in rem assets, 
intellectual property rights, prospecting, extraction or developing of natural resources, 
including public law concessions, etc.” Id. 
 27. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment 
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one “home” state, where the investor maintains its nationality,” and 
one “host” state, where the investments are physically located.28  As 
with any transaction, FDIs provide benefits and costs for involved 
parties.29  Benefits for the host state can include: (1) an influx of 
wealth for local producers supplying goods or services to investors; 
(2) new local jobs; and (3) development of physical infrastructure 
through new and superior technology from investors.30  However, 
consequences may include: (1) corruption; (2) environmental 
degradation; and (3) displacement of local competitors.31  The most 
relevant consequence for this Article’s purposes is that the 
substantive rules protecting FDI can “encroach on the host state’s 
sovereignty.”32 
This “encroachment” lies at the heart of the BIT’s protections of 
foreign investments and enforcement process.33  An aggrieved party 
who believes the other party violated a protected transaction under 
the BIT may seek redress in the host state’s domestic courts.34  
Additionally, aggrieved foreign investors, such as MNCs, may 
initiate arbitration proceedings in an international tribunal pursuant to 
provisions within the BIT.35  However, foreign investors often faced 
judicial bias in favor of the host state when the investor attempted to 
seek remedy in the host state’s domestic courts.36  Accordingly, 
contemporary arbitrations are frequently heard before ICSID, “an 
institution within the World Bank Group formed in 1966 to conduct 
and promote [ISDS].”37 
 
 
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 406-07 (2006). 
 28. Id. at 407.  These FDIs often take the form of investors, such as MNCs, purchasing 
and developing productive facilities, such as factories, mines, drilling platforms, or offices. 
Id.  These investments can also include ownership of subsidiary corporations within the host 
state.  Id. 
 29. Id. at 408. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 408-09 (2006) 
 33. See id. at 416. 
 34. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign 
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 265 (1994).  The host state is the country in whose 
territory the investment was made.  Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?, 
43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 640 (2018). 
 37. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 415 (2006). 
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B. Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Two interrelated solutions arose around the 1960s to combat 
biases foreign investors faced in trying to enforce their agreements in 
host state’s domestic courts—an international forum through ICSID 
and the arbitration mechanism of ISDS.38  Proposals at the United 
Nations sought to resolve disputes between host nations and foreign 
investors under international law, which contradicted sovereign views 
that domestic law governed those agreements.39  After a series of 
proposals and debates, members of the World Bank established the 
ICSID Convention in 1965 with the goal of providing conciliation 
and arbitration facilities to resolve international investment disputes.40  
The ICSID Convention entered into force in 1966 after the first 20 
States ratified it, and it is currently ratified by 154 Contracting 
States.41  This treaty created ICSID, an institution committed to 
resolving disputes between countries and international investors.42  
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that “the jurisdiction of 
the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Centre.”43  Though this language did not define how 
to give written consent, consent through BITs became standard 
practice.44  Lastly, States that are party to the ICSID Convention are 
“bound to comply with any award issued against them by an ICSID 
arbitral tribunal, and to enforce such awards made against other host 
 
 38. See Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better 
Alternative?, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 639-45 (2018). 
 39. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 48-49 (2009). 
 40. Roderick Abbott, Fredrik Erixon & Martina Francesca Ferracane, Demystifying 
Investor- State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT’L POLITICAL ECON., 5, 
https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/OCC52014__1.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019). 
 41. ICSID Convention, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention.aspx (lasted visited Dec. 
17, 2019). 
 42. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States art. 1, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 182. 
 43. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 194. Under Article 
25, “[w]hen the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally.”   CAN THIS BE A SHORT CITE?  
 44. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 56 (2009). 
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states.”45 
On the other hand, ISDS is the legal mechanism that “allows 
[MNCs] a forum, other than the court system of the country in which 
the dispute arose . . ., to arbitrate a controversy between a corporation 
and the host country.”46  ISDS provides foreign corporations an 
opportunity to be heard in a fair and neutral manner by allowing both 
parties to appoint arbitrators.47  In order for MNCs to gain access to 
ISDS, there must be an underlying treaty negotiated by the host 
country’s government and the country in which the MNC is 
incorporated, which is where the BITs enter the fray.48  Host 
countries may also statutorily provide an ISDS tribunal jurisdiction 
over a dispute or by contracting for that forum with the investor.49  
Regardless of the method, States now give ex ante consent for foreign 
investors to have the exclusive right to bring a claim before an 
international tribunal.50  In contrast, any State government seeking 
relief against a foreign investor or other domestic corporation seeking 
relief against their home State must rely on domestic courts for their 
claims.51  It is through these mechanisms—ICSID as a forum and 
ISDS clauses within BITs as the pathway to that forum—that 
internationalized contracts can exist.52 
C. The Internationalized Contract 
An internationalized contract is a domestic contract that is 
legally considered an “investment” that falls within the ambit of a 
BIT’s umbrella clause or FET language, which grants that contract 
international legal protection under the treaty itself.53  In essence, the 
internationalization doctrine is a merger between international law’s 
strong protections for foreign property and domestic contracts.54 
BITs by their nature incorporate broad standards aimed at 
protecting foreign property from undue interference by the host 
 
 45. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 415 (2006). 
 46. Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?, 
43 Brook. J. Int’l L. 639, 639 (2018).  Later, in 1959, the first ISDS clause emerged from a 
bilateral trade agreement between Germany and Pakistan.  Id. at 647. 
 47. Id. at 639. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 639-40. 
 52. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 260 (2015). 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
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state.55  Though these standards rarely differed in textual substance 
from domestic contracts, tribunals regularly expanded the ambit of 
BIT guarantees.56  Tribunals tend to expand treaty protection for 
transnational property to cover the total field of possible state 
action.57  In practice, this meant that state action at all levels, 
including legislative, executive, or judicial, and regulatory domains 
such as taxation to public health to environmental regulations were 
not free from international scrutiny so long as they affected foreign 
property.58  Not only did tribunals tackle direct takings and State 
regulatory efforts to destroy the investment’s economic value, 
tribunals also required compensating for partial takings and the 
simple diminution of an investment’s value.  As the ICSID case, 
CMS Gas v. Argentina, reveals, domestic contracts fall well within 
the scope of foreign property.59 
In CMS Gas v. Argentina, an American investor, CMS, claimed 
that its host state destroyed the value of a gas transportation 
concession operated by its local subsidiary.60  CMS argued that this 
loss directly violated its domestic License contract with Argentina 
and, therefore, fell within the ambit of the Argentina-U.S. BIT’s 
umbrella clause.61  Additionally, CMS argued that Argentina violated 
the BIT’s FET provision when it left CMS’s investment in an 
unpredictable and unstable condition.62  While Argentina argued that 
it enacted a series of regulatory measures to manage its on-going 
financial crisis, the tribunal held that the regulations partially vitiated 
the value of CMS’s investment and so the State must compensate 
them accordingly.63  In viewing a domestic contract as an investment, 
CMS Gas v. Argentina exemplified how internationalized contracts 
function as a merger of international property protections and 
domestic contract principles.64  By considering Argentina’s violation 
of CMS’s contract as tantamount to treaty violation, ICSID 
 
 55. See id. at 260. 
 56. Id. at 261. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 261 (2015). 
 59. See generally CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award (May 21, 2005). 
 60. Id. at ¶¶ 68-73. 
 61. Id. at ¶ 296. This umbrella clause provided that each party “shall observe any 
obligation it may have entered into with regard to an investment.” 
 62. Id. at ¶¶ 266-67. This BIT’s FET provision provides: “Investment shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in 
no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law.” 
 63. Id. at ¶ 281. 
 64. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 260-61 (2015). 
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internationalized the relevant domestic contract.65 
Notably, CMS Gas v. Argentina also provides an example of 
how ICSID interprets both primary methods of internationalizing a 
contract—umbrella clauses and the FET.66  ICSID held that domestic 
contract breaches are likely protected under umbrella clauses when 
there is “significant interference by governments or public agencies 
with the rights of the investor.”67  Additionally, ICSID held that the 
FET, though vague as it is in most BITs, requires host states to ensure 
investments maintain stability and predictability to protect the 
legitimate expectations of investors.68 
1. Umbrella Clauses 
As CMS Gas shows, one of the primary methods through which 
domestic contracts gain international legal effect is through umbrella 
clauses.69  In essence, umbrella clause are contractual clauses within 
BITs that purport to include contractual claims within the “umbrella” 
of a BIT’s protections.70  Normally, mere contractual violations 
cannot trigger treaty protection under customary international law, 
umbrella clauses attempt to circumvent this tradition through explicit 
statements that breaches of contract will be considered breaches of 
treaty as well.71  In doing so, an umbrella clause can elevate a 
violation of a contractual provision to an independent international 
law violation, and, thus, provide foreign investors access to 
international institutions to resolve their disputes.72  This method 
“extends the public international law principle of pacta sunt servanda 
to commercial contracts with States by transforming contractual 
obligations into obligations under the applicable investment treaty.”73  
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award at ¶ 299. 
 68. See id. at ¶¶ 279-81. 
 69. Andrey V. Kuznetsov, The Limits of Contractual Stabilization Clauses for 
Protecting International Oil and Gas Investments Examined Through the Prism of the 
Sakhalin-2PSA: Mandatory Law, the Umbrella Clause, and the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard, 22 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 223, 250 (2015). 
 70. Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1006 (2011). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Andrey V. Kuznetsov, The Limits of Contractual Stabilization Clauses for 
Protecting International Oil and Gas Investments Examined Through the Prism of the 
Sakhalin-2PSA: Mandatory Law, the Umbrella Clause, and the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard, 22 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 223, 250 (2015). 
 73. Id. at 250-51; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT) (defining “pacta sunt servanda” as a principle where “every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
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Among the roughly 2600 BITs concluded worldwide, about forty 
percent include some version of an umbrella clause.74 
Umbrella clauses range in scope depending on the BIT in which 
they are found.75  They are a regular feature of investment treaties and 
call for the observance of the obligations entered into by the host 
State.76  Umbrella clauses grant subject-matter jurisdiction that can 
relate merely from investments directly dealing with the BIT all the 
way to any investment in which the State is engaged.77  Hence, an 
umbrella clause’s ability to internationalize a contract is directly 
connected to the scope of its language.78  Broader umbrella clauses 
can create international obligations for host states that can elevate 
contract breaches.79  For example, language may state that the State 
shall “observe any obligation it may have entered to” or “observe any 
obligation it has assumed.”80  These are the quintessential umbrella 
clauses within BITs.81  A modern example of an umbrella clause is 
seen in the multilateral investment treaty, the Energy Treaty Charter, 
which provides that “Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an 
Investor of any other Contracting Party.”82  As most investor 
contracts with a foreign sovereign can be characterized as 
“investments” for the purposes of the umbrella clauses, violating 
 
faith”). 
 74. Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1007 (2011).  In 
fact, countries regularly and favorably use BITs to solicit foreign investment and to ensure 
protection of their citizens who invest abroad. Id. at 1008.  Today, BITs typically cover four 
substantive issues: (1) “conditions for the admission of foreign investors to the host State;” 
(2) “standards of treatment of foreign investors;” (3) “protection against expropriation;” and 
(4) “methods for resolving investment disputes.”; id. at 1008-09. 
 75. OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, in 
International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations 101-34, 
102 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471535.pdf. 
 76. Michael Feit, ATTRIBUTION AND THE UMBRELLA CLAUSE – IS THERE A WAY 
OUT OF THE DEADLOCK?, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 21, 22 (2012). 
 77. OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, in 
International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations 101-34, 
102 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471535.pdf. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Energy Charter Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, 109.  While the 
Energy Charter Treaty itself is a multilateral treaty and not a BIT, it is an example of how 
umbrella clauses exist in the language of several types of international agreements to create 
expansive obligations on Contracting States. 
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these domestic contracts becomes tantamount to a treaty violation.83  
It is this very broad language that allows MNCs to bring States to 
arbitration for contractual, that is “investment,” violations.84 
Generally, if an umbrella clause is used to “internationalize” a 
contract, the following requirements must be met: (1) “the breach of 
contract must be attributable to the state;” and (2) “the breach of 
contract must amount to a violation of the umbrella clause.”85  The 
idea behind the process is that investors bring claims against host 
states when they believe contractual obligations were breached.86  
Despite the theoretical scope for umbrella clauses, ICSID is currently 
split as how much substantive force these clauses carry.87 
As previously mentioned, CMS Gas v. Argentina interpreted the 
scope of umbrella clauses broadly.88  In that case, ICSID noted that 
purely commercial aspects of contract do not necessarily warrant 
umbrella clause protections, but it is enough that the government 
interferes with the investor’s rights under the domestic contract.89 
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania provides an even broader 
interpretation.90  In this case, ICSID expressly stated that a breach of 
the domestic contract amounts to a breach of the relevant treaty.91  In 
that case, the treaty “internationalized” the domestic contract by 
elevating a standard breach of contract to a breach of international 
obligations under that same treaty.92 
However, ICSID gave an umbrella clause a restrictive 
interpretation in SGS v. Pakistan.93  In that case, SGS directly argued 
that the umbrella clause elevated all contractual claims to the level of 
treaty claims.94  However, ICSID held that as long as the contractual 
 
 83. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 250 (2015). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Michael Feit, Attribution and the Umbrella Clause – Is There a Way out of the 
Deadlock?, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 21, 22-23 (2012). 
 86. Id. at 22. 
 87. Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1007 (2011). 
 88. See CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award at ¶ 299. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See generally Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award 
(Oct. 12, 2005). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005). 
 94. Id. ¶ 98. The Swiss-Pakistani BIT’s umbrella clause stated, “[e]ither Contracting 
Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of commitments it has entered into with 
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breaches failed to trigger additional protections under the BIT, SGS 
could not seek remedy before the tribunal.95  ICSID stated that it 
needed a special agreement by the parties to pass judgment on the 
contractual claims in that case, but concluded that no such agreement 
existed.96 
While umbrella clauses carry great potential to elevate domestic 
contracts, their effectiveness ultimately depends on ICSID’s 
willingness to interpret them broadly.97 
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
While both umbrella clauses and the FET are substantive 
methods to internationalize contracts, interpretations of FET are more 
amorphous and arguably more powerful.98  The FET is a “catch-all 
autonomous standard of protection found in BITs that address a 
variety of unjust governmental actions that harm investments but 
which are not covered by other more specific standards of 
protection.”99  Relevant factors for finding a FET violation include: 
“(1) ‘whether the State has failed to offer a stable and predictable 
legal framework;’ (2) ‘whether the State made specific 
representations to the investor;’ (3) ‘whether due process has been 
denied to the investor;’ (4) ‘whether there is an absence of 
transparency in the legal procedure or in actions of the State;’ (5) 
‘whether there has been harassment, coercion, abuse of power or 
other bad faith conduct by the host State;’ and (6) ‘whether any of the 
actions of the State can be labeled as arbitrary, discriminatory or 
inconsistent.”100  The idea is that if a State action violates the FET as 
it relates to the investment, which can include domestic contracts, 
then investors are entitled to a remedy before ICSID.101 
In terms of protective power, the FET surpasses umbrella 
 
respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.” Id. at ¶ 97.  
 95. SGS v. Pakistan, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 161. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See generally SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 
(2005). 
 98. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 258-61 (2015). 
 99. Andrey v. Kuznetsov, The Limits of Contractual Stabilization Clauses for Protecting 
International Oil and Gas Investments Examined Through the Prism of the Sakhalin-2PSA: 
Mandatory Law, the Umbrella Clause, and the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 22 
Williamette J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 223, 254 (2015). 
 100. Id. at 254-55; See Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, P 284 (Jan. 14, 2010). 
 101. See Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18 at P 284. 
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clauses because it is not limited to the literal observance of 
contractual commitments.102  The FET protects domestic contracts 
from even governmental depreciation of a contract’s value on 
grounds ranging from discrimination to a failure to meet an investor’s 
legitimate expectations.103 
The Tecmed Case is the most frequently cited case that 
interprets the FET, and it is also one of the most expansive 
interpretations to date.104  The court in the Tecmed Case used the 
“good faith” interpretation of FET from Mondev, which provided: 
“To the modern eye, what is unfair and unequitable need not equate 
with the outrageous or the egregious.  In particular, a State may treat 
foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily 
acting in bad faith.”105  In light of this definition, the ICSID stated the 
following: 
[Fair and equitable treatment] requires the Contracting 
Parties to provide to international investments 
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations 
that were taken into account by the foreign investor to 
make the investment.  The foreign investor expects the 
host State to act in a consistent manner, free form 
ambiguity and totally transparent in its relation with 
the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand 
any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives, to 
be able to plan its investment and comply with such 
regulation.106 
Under the Tecmed Case, the FET protects the investor’s 
legitimate expectations, which entails the need for consistency, non-
arbitrariness, freedom from ambiguity, and “total transparency,” as 
well as compensation for the deprivation of the investment.107 
Though FET interpretations tend to grant it high substantive 
protections, ICSID does not always immediately defer to that broad 
 
 102. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 259 (2015). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 265; see generally Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 23, 2003). 
 105. Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 at ¶ 153-54; see Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. 
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 116 (Oct. 11, 2002). 
 106. Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 at ¶ 154 
 107. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 266 (2015). 
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interpretation.108  For example, in CMS Gas v. Argentina, the tribunal 
took a more cautious approach in interpreting the FET.109  While 
CMS explicitly cited Tecmed in their argument, ICSID also looked to 
the contours of the BIT itself, commonalities among other BITs, and 
commonalities among prior ICSID cases in its reasoning.110  
Specifically, ICSID reasoned that the FET calls for a stable legal and 
business environment because the BIT’s preamble envision that the 
FET is desirable “to maintain a stable framework for investments and 
maximize effective use of economic resources.”111  Additionally, 
ICSID reasoned that a significant number of BITs “unequivocally 
show” that the FET is “inseparable from stability and predictability” 
and that many “arbitral decisions and scholarly writings point in the 
same direction.”112  Sure enough, ICSID does cite to the Tecmed 
Case, but not before going further to look to precedent and 
contextualizing the FET within this specific dispute.113 
Regardless of whether corporations use FET or umbrella clauses 
to internationalize domestic contracts, the reasons for using either 
contractual strategy are similar—investors are acting to protect their 
investments.114 
3. How MNCs Use Internationalized Contracts 
Generally, the internationalized contract arises from a domestic 
agreement that imposes substantial risks for the investor.115  The 
duties involved for these contracts can include the exploration, 
extraction, and sale of a state’s natural resources, the construction of 
fundamental infrastructure, and the operation of utilities.116  These 
domestic contracts entail some temporary transfer of the state’s 
sovereign prerogatives to the MNC.117  There is an expectation that 
these contracts will benefit the economy of the host State in a 
meaningful way.118  Given such high-stakes-investments, foreign 
investors readily seek compulsory arbitration to resolve any major 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award at ¶¶ 279-81. 
 110. Id. at ¶¶ 273-76. 
 111. Id. at ¶ 273. 
 112. Id. at ¶ 276. 
 113. Id. at ¶ 279. 
 114. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 250-51 (2015). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 250. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 250-51. 
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grievances they may have against a state.119 
D. Populism 
Globalization and the growing role of international institutions 
in investor-state affairs generated some populist backlash.120  
Populism is an “ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the . . . general will of the people.”121  
Despite this dichotomy, populists typically distinguish “pure people” 
from other groups, such as immigrants, ethnic or racial minorities, 
criminals, or some other group that is “singled out as undeserving in 
a specific national context.”122  This division means that populists, in 
practice, divide society into three groups—the elite, the majority, and 
the minority.123  Populist leaders focus heavily on the principle that 
the people should rule, and these leaders claim legitimacy on the 
grounds that they speak for the people.124  Populism fights against 
globalization in ways that seeks to limit the scope of investor-state 
relations.125  If the sovereignty is the normative paradigm that governs 
international law and foreign-investor-based concerns gave rise to 
mechanisms permitting the internationalized contract, then populism 
is the sovereign response that criticizes that “solution” as going too 
far.126 
Populism in any given State is in large part influenced by how 
globalization affected that State.127  Globalization greatly expanded 
opportunities for exporters, MNCs, investors, and international 
 
 119. Id. at 250. 
 120. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON 
POLITICS, 1 (June 20, 2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/22D6468FD3316BB74A63BAD7BBAE8E5C/S1537592719000975a.pdf/
populism_and_backlashes_against_international_courts.pdf.  For the purposes of this article, 
a backlash is a government action that attempts to curb or reverse the authority of an 
international court.  Id. at 2. 
 121. Id. at 5. 
 122. Id. at 1. 
 123. Id. at 13. 
 124. Id. at 5-6. 
 125. See Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON 
POL., 1-4 (June 20, 2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/22D6468FD3316BB74A63BAD7BBAE8E5C/S1537592719000975a.pdf/
populism_and_backlashes_against_international_courts.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Dani Rodrick, Populism and the economics of globalization, J. INT. BUS. POLICY, 2, 
(Dec. 2018), https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-
rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf. 
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banks, and professional classes to take advantage of larger markets.128  
In doing so, globalization decreased global inequality by helping poor 
countries, such as China, adapt to changing markets and international 
trade to spur growth and reduce poverty.129  However, globalization 
also increased domestic inequalities by creating several wedges in 
society between capital and labor, skilled and unskilled workers, 
employers and employees, globally mobile professionals and local 
producers, and elites and ordinary people.130  Those wedges drew the 
ire of a growing populist ideology because populists felt that the rules 
for international market competition were unfair and MNCs and 
foreigners were taking advantage of that unfair system.131  Populist 
leaders can more easily mobilize along ethno-national or cultural 
lines when globalization becomes salient in the form of immigration 
and refugees.132  On the other hand, populists may mobilize around 
socioeconomic class lines when globalization takes the form of trade, 
finance, and foreign investment.133  In essence, populist movements 
provide narratives that motivate political mobilization around 
common concerns, or the “enemies of the people.”134  Therefore, 
populism is ultimately a question of how States frame their response 
to globalization.135 
III. ANALYSIS 
State voices are clear regarding the internationalized contract: 
they go too far and MNCs should no longer be able to leverage them 
as tools against sovereignty.136  To their credit, States properly point 
out that only foreign investors may access ISDS, which makes 
arbitrations under BITs seem one-sided.137  However, these criticisms 
of the internationalized contract and its enforcement undermine its 
limited applicability and status as an insecure doctrine.138  Despite 
these dubious merits of populist sentiments, the backlash remains and 
 
 128. Id. at 12. 
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 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 2. 
 133. Dani Rodrick, Populism and the economics of globalization, J. INT. BUS. POLICY, 2, 
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 136. Infra Part III(A). 
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any further action against BITs, ISDS, and ICSID, suggest that the 
internationalized contract’s days are numbered.139 
A. The Reason States Are Upset 
The degree to which internationalized contracts grant MNCs 
access to tribunals also counteracts populist principles of sovereignty 
and skepticism of corporate power over the people.140  The 
uniqueness of the internationalized contract lies in the sheer 
flexibility and degree of access that MNCs have to international 
tribunals and remedies through a purely domestic vehicle.141  While 
access to ISDS in ICSID is commonplace with BITs at a purely 
international, or horizontal, level, the internationalized contract goes 
one step further by accomplishing the same result by elevating purely 
domestic affairs to the international stage in a vertical manner.142 
Internationalized contracts, unlike domestic contracts, occupy a 
hierarchical position outside and above the entire domestic legal 
order.143  This is because the breach of an internationalized contract 
becomes a treaty violation, which comes within the jurisdiction of 
judicial bodies like ICSID.144  The governing core principle behind 
this institutional interest is that domestic law cannot excuse a state’s 
violation of its international obligations nor its duty to compensate.145  
By haling states to institutions like ICSID, MNCs unilaterally force 
states to obey their obligations at a domestic level, run the risk of 
compulsory arbitration to enforce the violated agreement, or abandon 
the ISDS system entirely.146  From the populist perspective, the voice 
of the people, in this case the sovereign State, is shut down by outside 
forces that fundamental exceed domestic control.147 
 
 139. Infra Part III(D). 
 140. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 243-44 
(2015). 
 141. See id. at 240-44. 
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 143. Id. at 240. 
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 145. Id. at 241; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, 1969 (“A party 
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treaty.”). 
 146. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 251 (2015). 
 147. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON 
POL., 1, 7 (June 20, 2019) (discussing that it is easier for populists to use sovereignty-based 
arguments to attack foreign institutions adjudicating domestic matters).  But see Emily 
Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?, 43 BROOK. J. 
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That populist perspective is exacerbated by the internationalized 
contract’s insulation from all forms of domestic public law, ranging 
from environmental and public health to management of national 
emergencies.148  MNCs may seek remedies for small infractions, such 
as national regulations that abrogate the contract, materially breach it, 
or even significantly depreciate its value.149  Thus, internationalized 
contract doctrine becomes a public lawmaking deterrence against 
states that may otherwise elect to enact laws that may risk violating 
the contract in question.150  In doing so, MNCs directly affect not only 
international law, but also domestic law of a given state, which runs 
afoul the populist principles that reject “outside” voices from 
influencing internal affairs in a meaningful way.151 
B. Populist Backlash 
Tangible examples of populist backlash against the 
internationalized contract doctrines includes States criticizing ISDS 
and ICSID, as well as seeking potential alternatives to both.152  In 
2016, the European Union Parliament adopted a series of 
recommendations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (“TTIP”), which included an amendment that sought to 
replace ISDS with a new system entirely.153  The amendment called 
for a system that was “subject to democratic principles and scrutiny” 
that requires “publicly appointed, independent professional judges in 
public hearings.”154  The goal of this “European Commission’s 
Investment Court System” is to replace ISDS over time and “further 
increase the efficiency, consistency, and legitimacy of the 
international investment dispute resolution system.”155  Presumably, 
the internationalized contract cannot survive in a domestic regime 
whose purpose is to balance a dispute resolution system which 
maintained strong international protections for foreign investments—
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a core aspect of the internationalization doctrine.156  In summation, 
the European Union perceives that the manner in which MNCs use 
ISDS is unfair to the State and thus created a system under its own 
regime that fell in line with populist concepts of fairness.157 
The European Commission’s backlash also challenged the 
legitimacy of ICSID as a whole.158  In Micula v. Romania, the Micula 
brothers brought a claim in ICSID against Romania under the 
Sweden-Romanian BIT after Romania withdrew economic incentives 
that harmed the brothers’ business.159  With the European 
Commission as an amicus curiae, Romania argued that ICSID should 
deny jurisdiction because Romania changed its laws to comply with 
European Union competition law when it acceded to the EU.160  
However, ICSID rejected the argument and issued an award for the 
Micula brothers with an accompanying order for Romania to pay 
$250 million compensation.161  However, in May 2014, the European 
Commission issued an injunction to prevent Romania from honoring 
the ICSID award.162  After an investigation, the European 
Commission enjoined Romania from honoring the award on the 
ground that it infringed European Union law and ordered Romania to 
recover any money already paid.163  By issuing an injunction, the 
European Union’s populist sentiments directly undermined ICSID’s 
power that treats all awards as final judgments within the individual 
signatory States’ domestic courts.164  
Latin American countries mirrored Europe’s populist 
perceptions of unfairness in the ISDS and ICSID systems.165  In 2007, 
Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID after submitting a Notice under 
 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
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11, 2013). 
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overturned the European Commission’s injunction. See generally T‑624/15, European Foods 
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Article 71 of the ICSID Convention.166  Bolivian President Evo 
Morales stated that “Governments from Latin America and I think all 
over the world never win the cases. The transnationals always 
win.”167  Then, Ecuador and Venezuela withdrew from ICSID in 2009 
and 2012, respectively.168  Since that time, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela terminated some of their existing BITs and all three have 
not signed any new investment agreements.169  These States were 
motivated by the sentiment that foreign investments “promote 
imperialism and hinders the distribution of benefits from natural 
resources to the people.”170  While populism did not eliminate the 
ISDS and ICSID systems, it limited their scope in States that took 
political action against them.171 
C. Are Internationalized Contracts Really So Bad? 
Despite the breadth and power of internationalized contracts, 
their reach is limited by the practical need for an underlying treaty.172  
Moreover, other private entities, such as people and domestic 
organizations, do not have the same flexibility as MNCs to treaty 
shop for more expansive opportunities to hale States into ISDS.173 
1. Treaties – The Lifeblood of Internationalized Contracts 
A key element in “internationalizing” contracts is the use of 
treaties as a necessary catalyst for international effect.174  By 
considering domestic contracts as “investments” under umbrella 
terms, treaties do the necessary legwork that gives corporations the 
right to bring states into international tribunals for violating domestic 
contracts or even just depreciating their value.175  However, unless a 
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 168. Id. at 432.  A 2008 empirical study by Washington and Lee University Associate 
Professor of Law Susan Frack revealed that governments won 57.7% of investment treaty 
cases whereas investors prevailed in only 38.5% of cases.  Id. at 433.  While the factual 
correctness of individual State populist responses to globalization is outside the scope of this 
article, it should be noted that feelings of unfairness regarding international tribunals is 
sufficient to motivate populist political responses.  Id. at 432-33. 
 169. See id. at 432. 
 170. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON 
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treaty is ratified by at least two States, the domestic contract lacks the 
vehicle to gain international power.176  By including umbrella terms 
and FET, the BITs themselves provide for ISDS in ICSID and, by 
extension the internationalized contract.177  However, even the 
presence of a BIT is not enough because a private party must still be 
able to access that treaty.178 
2. Treaty Shopping, Nationality, and Non-Multinational 
Corporation Entities 
Another limit in “internationalizing” contracts is the inherent 
need for fluid nationality in relation to a relevant treaty.179  While 
States view the internationalized contract as undermining 
sovereignty, the doctrine is still meaningfully limited by sovereign-
focused realities, such as nationality.180  A BIT’s aegis only covers 
investments that relate to its signatory nations, which requires any 
MNC seeking relief under that BIT to acquire the nationality of one 
of those States.181   MNCs have fluid nationality in the sense that their 
several subsidiaries and potential acquisitions permit them to 
effectively gain the nationality of any State they choose in order to 
use a particular treaty.182  This fluid nationality allows MNCs to treaty 
shop to maximize their chances of finding a mechanism to force 
States into ISDS before ICSID in order to enforce domestic 
agreements.183  However, non-MNC entities do not have this option 
as readily available because people and domestic organizations are 
usually bound to a single State.184  Moreover, some MNCs may not 
have the necessary resources to change their nationality beyond the 
ones they currently have, which limits the scope of their treaty 
shopping.185  While these limitations may suggest that the 
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internationalized contract is far less threatening to State sovereignty 
than populist sentiments may argue, the doctrine remains at risk of 
disappearing in the face of a continued populist assault.186 
D. The Future of the Internationalized Contract in the Face of 
Populism 
The sovereign response to the internationalized contract is not 
kind.187  The main tool for internationalizing contracts—BITs—faced 
populist resistance because of State distrust in ISDS’s ability to 
appropriately resolve investment disputes.188  Some countries outright 
reject the use of ISDS in their investment treaties.189  Australia stated 
that it will not support ISDS in future trade agreements.190  Brazil 
refuses to sign trade agreements that contain ISDS.191  South Africa 
and India stated that they will withdraw from treaties with ISDS 
clauses.192  Opponents of ISDS argue that the FET standard is overly 
broad and should be properly defined through clearer language in 
future BITs to promote predictability.193  Similarly, others suggest 
delineating specific types of claims that investors can bring under 
ISDS, such as “discrimination and expropriation and clarify that all 
other disputes are to be brought to the domestic court system of the 
State.”194  Others still suggest that BITs should require foreign 
investors to exhaust all local remedies before they seek ISDS.195  
Though internationalized contracts remain intact today by virtue of 
ISDS, opponents are clear that they feel that it limits State 
sovereignty.196 
 
access to ISDS in ICSID through a treaty between Bolivia and the Netherlands by shifting its 
Cayman Island subsidiary’s shares to Bechtel’s Dutch subsidiary.  Id. ¶¶ 68, 182. 
 186. Infra Part III(D). 
 187. See Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better 
Alternative?, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 658 (2018). 
 188. Id. at 659. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 659-60. 
 191. Id. at 659. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 659-60. 
 195. Id. at 660. 
 196. Id.  The European Union voted in favor of the Transatlantic Trade Partnership, an 
investment agreement between the United States and the EU, on the condition that ISDS was 
replaced with a new system to resolve international investment disputes—the Investment 
Court System.  Id.  The concern was that ISDS was not public or transparent, corporations 
were not subject to public law, and that the interests of foreign investors began to supersede 
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Despite these potentially far-reaching changes, there are reasons 
to question the populist sentiment that the internationalized contract 
undermines sovereignty.197  Though criticized as asymmetrical, ISDS 
still permits host states to bring counterclaims against MNCs.198  
Moreover, populist responses neglect that States, as hosts, inherently 
have great sovereign authority to police transactions within their 
borders.199  Additionally, ostracizing foreign investors, ISDS, and 
ICSID as the “other” does not necessarily justify the belief that 
domestic courts are better suited to resolve foreign investment 
disputes.200  The populist concern that MNCs go too far seems 
dubious when the internationalized contract itself is deeply in flux, 
which leads to unreliable results for the MNC pursuing arbitration 
before ICSID.201 
Developing or poorer countries have an incentive to sign BITs to 
promote foreign investment, which increases capital and associated 
technologies that flows to their territories.202  If States wish to limit or 
even withdraw from BITs or ISDS, they necessarily remove the 
international protections that MNCs relied upon to reduce the risks 
for transnational investments.203  If the international enforcement 
mechanism is removed, MNCs naturally have far less incentive to 
invest in a host State that no longer wishes to independently protect 
the MNC’s investment interests.204  BITs, by their nature, “have the 
effect of stabilizing a country’s investment policy and its legal and 
contractual commitments to individual foreign investors.”205  By 
abdicating these international obligations, States elect to forgo any 
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America wishes to retain the ISDS system. 
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 203. See id. at 95 (“The basic working assumption upon which BITs rest is that clear and 
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benefit they once drew from those investors.206 
Regardless of the merits behind populist sentiments, States are 
clear that they are not happy.207  These populist proposals, if 
implemented, may spell the death knell of the internationalization 
doctrine.208  If States begin actively negotiating for clearer language 
in their BITs, MNCs cannot rely on umbrella clauses or the FET 
standard to elevate mere contractual violations to the level of a treaty 
violation.209  By stripping away the vagueness that gave rise to the 
internationalized contract, States could effectively remove subject-
matter jurisdiction from ICSID to ever entertain these suits again.210  
Furthermore, if States outright abandon ISDS as a dispute resolution 
mechanism, MNCs may likely be forced to return to using the 
domestic courts of their host state, much like the earliest foreign 
investors that came before them.211  Neither option is favorable, but 
because BITs require sovereign consent, even MNCs with fluid 
nationality may not be able to rely on the internationalized contract 
for much longer.212 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The status of the internationalized contract is symptomatic of the 
continued health of broad BITs and ISDS as a whole.213  The 
internationalized contract is based on a doctrine that, though 
potentially robust, is consistently in flux, which renders it unreliable 
in practice.214  Despite that unreliability, a galvanized populist 
sentiment poses a significant risk to the doctrine with more States 
seeking to limit or withdraw from BITs and ISDS.215  If States choose 
to still sign BITs, they may reaffirm their sovereignty by drafting 
narrower FET standards and umbrella clauses, which may mark the 
demise of the internationalized contract.216  With BITs rendered 
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useless in enforcing domestic contracts, MNCs may be forced to play 
by sovereign rules within domestic courts.217  Whether foreign 
investors retaliate to these limitations—and whether populist States 
even care—remains to be seen.218  However, the populist State 
response is obvious: the internationalized contract and its underlying 
mechanisms are in trouble.219 
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